In a recent decision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, two ex-spouses
argued about whether they had to pay for college expenses. The case, titled In the Matter of Christian Poulin and Rose Marie
Poulin Wall, took a hard look at the specific language used in the
parties’ Divorce Decree. The language stated, in pertinent part, “The parties agree to contribute to their
children’s college education to the extent each party is financially able. The actual contributions shall be determined
when each child is near college age.” The mother asked the father to pay
75%, the father refused and attempted to pay a lower number, and this case
ensued.
The father argued that the
agreement lacked specificity, and cited another New Hampshire Supreme Court
case, In the Matter of Scott & Pierce. The father argued that the
language of the Decree only required them to meet and discuss the case, and
consistent with Scott, the case should be dismissed.
The Supreme Court disagreed. The
language in the Scott decree only stated the parties would sit down at a
future date to discuss paying for college. This was different from the language
in this case, which stated that the parties both “agreed to contribute to their
children’s college education”. This was a specific order to contribute, and
that any order dictating what amount that contribution to college would be if
the parties could not agree was merely to modify that initial order. The Court
sent the case back down to the Family Court to determine what amount each party
was financially able to contribute to their daughter’s college expenses.
This is an important example of
the importance of specific language in any request for a court order or
stipulation. Language is integral to law, as it should provide parties with a
clear indication of their rights and obligations moving forward.
If you need assistance
understanding the “language of law’, please contact
us today.
No comments:
Post a Comment